This paper explores the role of the biographer in compiling a biographical dictionary, focusing on al-ʿAbbādī's (d. 458/1066) work on the Shāfiʿī 'school' of law. The paper argues that al-ʿAbbādī straddles a fine line of faithful transmission of school doctrines and artful arrangement of the materials in order to shape the identity, authority structures, and doctrines of the school according to his vision. To highlight al-ʿAbbādī's role in constructing the identity and authority structures of the school the paper focuses on three areas: first, how al-ʿAbbādī lays out his vision of the school in the entry of the eponym of the school by delineating the areas of law that distinguish al-Shāfiʿī from other founders of schools of law; second, how alʿAbbādī deals with contradictory positions held among members of the school; third, how he gives the school of law also a theological identity (Ashʿarism) by discussing such topics as free will, the createdness of the Qurʾān, and the definition of faith (īmān). The paper details the author's range of editorial hints and techniques of presentation that guide his audience to the 'correct' Shāfiʿī doctrine. It presents reasons why al-ʿAbbādī takes recourse to these measures and points to the effects of his presentation of school doctrines.
Introduction
A particular feature of Arab-Muslim literature and culture is its vast numbers of biographical dictionaries. 1 Among the earliest of which we 1 Biographical notes are known by a variety of terms; widely used are the Arabic ṭabaqa, pl. ṭabaqāt, or tarjama, pl. tarājim, as well as sīra, pl. siyar. They are found in a variety of literature. Depending on how broadly one defines the genre, biographical information appears in historical narratives that, sometimes more as a side note, elaborate on people who lived during the time period under consideration or list those who died in a particular time span; in works specifically dedicated to a particular group of people; and in those devoted to a particular figure (usually called manāqib). 
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relevant for understanding the personality and the significance of the biographee. 4 However, the information gleaned from biographical entries often says less about the individual than the collective entity that this person belongs to because it captures primarily those aspects that associate that individual to the group. The biography reveals to the reader a framework within which to place the person in Islamic society, establishing the individual's doctrinal or political affiliations and/or whether s/he is a reliable transmitter of knowledge.
Despite the wealth of information that can be derived from biographical works, there are obvious limitations to this genre. The author selects the individuals he includes; it is neither all-inclusive nor a random distribution of people belonging to that group, which makes generalizations difficult to sustain. 5 Moreover, the biographer is not just a neutral compiler of information. Not only may he have his own 'agenda', but he also follows the cultural attitudes and literary conventions of his time. When highlighting an aspect of someone's personality, he draws on metaphors and topoi known and accepted by his audience. Tāj al-Dīn al-Subkī (d. 771/1370), for example, organized his biographical dictionary of the Shāfiʿī school according to centuries, based on the common belief in a prophetic report that every century a renewer (mujaddid) of the faith appears. Hence, he lists at the start of every century a reformer who, not surprisingly, came from among the ranks of Shāfiʿī jurists, with al-Shāfiʿī as the reformer for the third century AH. 6 b. Anas (d. 179/795), the eponym of the Mālikī school of law 7 . He states that Mālik was in his mother's womb for three years 8 -evidently a reflection of Mālik's doctrine of the 'sleeping fetus,' which holds that pregnancies may last up to three years.
The study of such biographical notes, though far from having exhausted the material, reveals important insights into Islamic civilization. 9 As Wadād al-Qāḍī poignantly states: 'biographical dictionaries are indeed a mirror in which are reflected some important aspects of the intellectual and cultural development of the Islamic community'. 10 The aim of this essay is to investigate the role the author of a biographical dictionary plays in shaping the identity of the group he documents by arranging and presenting his information in a particular way. In order to understand that role one must also look at the function this genre of literature serves. While the most important function of biographical works is to preserve history, it is a particular view of history that is portrayed in such works. Generally, one finds a somewhat idealized and mythologized version of history that pays attention not so much to events, but to fields of knowledge or expertise that characterize 7 Leder argues that despite a disdain for fiction in non-fictional Arabic narratives, the factuality of the information presented is frequently an illusion. . 10 Al-Qāḍī, 'Biographical Dictionaries,' 94.
JAIS ONLINE the commonality of the group. 11 Works that are devoted to a specific professional or doctrinal group of people tend to focus on the 'founder' as fountainhead of knowledge of the particular field the group represents (grammar, law, music, etc.) and how this knowledge is transmitted from one member in the group to another. 12 While the main function of a biographical work about such a group is to preserve the history of transmission of the professional knowledge and doctrines that distinguishes it, the biographer also engages in constructing its identity.
As will be shown in more detail below, he describes and, thereby, defines its characteristics, its distinctiveness from similar groups, its membership, 13 its boundaries, and its continuity. The biographer also determines the place of individual members within that group. 14 This is done, as illustrated below, by stating the opinions of a member and relating his/her views to those of other members or those accepted among the group as a whole. also given information about which view is accepted (or acceptable) and authoritative. One may find, for example, a comment that a particular view is a minority one or not in line with that of the founder. 15 The biographer constructs lines of authority by indicating the relationships between members of the group, especially to the founder or origins of the group. Biographical works on a specific group, however, are not only written for internal consumption by the members of the group. They also define the group's place in the wider history of Islamic civilization. Compiling the biographical entries, the author declares to the whole of the community its significance and contribution. He demonstrates the legitimacy of its professional activities and why it is authoritative in the field it represents. 16 In the enterprise to describe and define the identity of a group as well as its authority in society the biographer is crucial. Although he, doubtlessly, bases his narrative on already existing sources and information he received from previous generations, he is the one who selects whom to include and exclude from the group; 17 he adduces reports to reinforce the genealogy, the achievements, and the identity of the group; and he is the one who decides how to present his material. He is, thus, an active participant in shaping the group, its self-perception, and its image in society.
In what follows, I will illustrate how Abū ʿĀṣim al-ʿAbbādī helped to mold the identity of the Shāfiʿī school of law in his Kitāb Ṭabaqāt alfuqahāʾ al-shāfiʿiyya. For this purpose, I am paying more attention to the ways in which he presents information on jurists and doctrines of the Shāfiʿī school, rather than the historicity of his narrative. Furthermore, 15 As Hallaq has shown, a particular ruling that is designated at one point as a minority view does not have to remain that way. Later generations might accept it and elevate it to represent an acceptable alternative to the dominant doctrine of the school, cf. Hallaq, Authority, Continuity and Change, [194] [195] [196] [197] [198] [199] [200] [201] [202] [203] [204] [205] [206] [207] [208] . 16 22 Of the six generations, numerically the largest is the fourth (83 jurists), followed by the first (49 jurists). Both represent also the longest generations, containing individuals whose death dates cover a range of approximately 80 years. 23 The members of the fourth, and largest, generation, whose death dates fall predominantly into the second half of the fourth/tenth century, seem to be either better known to al-ʿAbbādī, or they reflect a growth period within the Shāfiʿī school; in contrast, the author lists only 26 jurists for the third and 33 for the fifth generation. Hallaq speaks of a growing Shāfiʿī school during the fourth/tenth century due to the numerous students of Ibn Surayj (d. 306/918), who are said to have spread the Shāfiʿī madhhab. 24 Halm documents that it was during this period that Shāfiʿī jurists were appointed as judges in cities such as Shīrāz, Nīshāpūr, Qom, and Damascus, taking offices previously occupied mainly by Ḥanafīs. 25 The purpose behind the Kitāb Ṭabaqāt al-fuqahāʾ al-shāfiʿiyya Al-ʿAbbādī's dictionary of Shāfiʿī jurists is remarkable in many ways. It is probably the earliest extant source devoted to members of the Shāfiʿī school, 26 28 For al-ʿAbbādī, it is not so much the individual personalities who are important in the link between the Companions and his own generation, than their function as transmitters of legal knowledge. He states that they are the ones who passed on the methods of jurisprudence (manāhij al-fiqh), the rulings (aḥkām), and knowledge of the precise meanings (maʿānī) and signs (aʿlām) from which legal rulings are derived. 29 Al-ʿAbbādī's purpose, thus, is to document and preserve knowledge of the fundamentals of law-finding. Although the author here insinuates that this knowledge has been transmitted to the current generation from the Companions, he makes no efforts to show any link between al-Shāfiʿī and the Companions or legal figures of generations preceding the eponym. Only once does he mention al-Shāfiʿī's teachers, and that occurs in the entry of a Shāfiʿī jurist of the fourth generation, where a chain of transmission between al-Shāfiʿī going back to the Prophet is listed in the way one usually finds for ḥadīth transmitters. Interestingly, no actual ruling or statement is tied to this chain. 30 AlʿAbbādī's claim that the legal knowledge of the Shāfiʿī school has been 27 Al-ʿAbbādī obviously considers the term salaf in its broad meaning of predecessors or forefathers, not restricted to the Companions or the first three generations of Muslims. 28 Al-ʿAbbādī, Kitāb Ṭabaqāt, 1. 29 Ibid., 1. 30 The chain of transmission goes from Muslim b. Khālid al-Zanjī and Saʿīd b. Sālim al-Qaddāḥ to Ibn Jurayḥ, ʿAṭāʾ b. Abī Rabāḥ, ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAbbās and Ibn ʿUmar, of which the last two have received their knowledge from the Prophet (ibid., 84). passed down to its members from the Companions, rather than having substantive value, is intended to evoke the image that the legal doctrine of the school perpetuates the legal tradition of the early community. Furthermore, starting his biographical work with the eponym of the school suggests an analogy: just as ḥadīth transmission has as its source of origin the Prophet, so al-Shāfiʿī is the fountainhead of legal knowledge for his followers. Similar to ḥadīth transmission, al-ʿAbbādī takes care in the individual entries to list, whenever he knows, the relationship among jurists of the Shāfiʿī school, especially their relationship to al-Shāfiʿī and his immediate disciples, and from whom they transmit. As for the concrete legal rulings that are transmitted, he concentrates, as he said in the introduction, on three areas: legal methodology (or what he calls manāhij), 31 applied law (aḥkām or furūʿ), and determining the meanings and signs by which to extend the existing law to situations not expressly stated (which would fall under the various types of lawfinding loosely subsumed under qiyās during the author's time period). 32 Yet, there is another purpose behind al-ʿAbbādī's composition. He explicitly states that he wished to provide for the Shāfiʿī school that which Ḥanafīs had done for theirs, namely listing and praising all those jurists who belong to their 'school'. 33 Al-ʿAbbādī's desire to imitate the way Ḥanafīs commemorate their members reflects that his purpose in writing this book it also one of identity-building for the Shāfiʿī school; his work will delineate the membership of the group, 31 Makdisi points out that the term uṣūl al-fiqh was not commonly used to designate works on legal theory until the late 4th/10th-early 5th/11th century. See JAIS ONLINE its doctrines, how they relate to its eponym and his teaching, and how they are different from other schools' teachings. 34 Al-ʿAbbādī's vision of the eponym of the school Al-ʿAbbādī's vision of the Shāfiʿī school is exemplified in his entry on the eponymous founder, Muḥammad b. Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī. 35 One notices that any actual biographical information concerning dates or events in alShāfiʿī's life is missing, most likely because he assumes that such information is already known to the reader. That al-ʿAbbādī knew details of al-Shāfiʿī's biography is evident throughout the book. Dispersed in entries on other jurists, he makes comments regarding al-Shāfiʿī's life and family, 36 his personal traits, 37 and behavior, 38 and he includes refutations against accusations that the eponym had Shīʿī sympathies. 39 Instead of recounting aspects of al-Shāfiʿī's personal life or views he held in the entry on the eponym, al-ʿAbbādī focuses on delineating those areas that, in his view, represent the intellectual contribution of al-Shāfiʿī and are the reason why he is superior to Mālik b. Anas and Abū Ḥanīfa and why scholars and common people adopt the Shāfiʿī school as their madhhab. 41 After presenting al-Shāfiʿī's full name and genealogy, he refers to several prophetic ḥadīths all stating the exceptional status of the Quraysh, the tribe to which al-Shāfiʿī belonged and which made him a distant relative of the Prophet. 42 The leadership status of al-Shāfiʿī, however, is not based on descent alone. 43 Rather, his superiority stems from the fact that:
'he classified the fundamentals [of law-finding] (al-uṣūl), then based upon them the derivation of law (al-furūʿ); further, he was more careful [in lawfinding] than [Mālik and Abū Ḥanīfa] because he took greater care in matters relating to ritual purity (ṭahārāt), provisions for acts of worship (sharāʾiṭ al-ʿibādāt), issues relating to marriage (ankiḥa), and sale contracts (biyāʿāt) '. 44 In this brief entry (fourteen lines) on al-Shāfiʿī, al-ʿAbbādī articulates that which he considers the defining characteristics of his school that originate and are personified in the eponymous founder. The Shāfiʿī school is distinguished by its knowledge of legal methodology and, hence, the correct derivation of rulings in key legal areas. When understanding the above mentioned areas of law broadly, then alShāfiʿī--and by extension his whole school--is superior in legal interpretation of matters concerning religious worship and dietary laws, personal status law, and commercial contracts, that is to say, the most important legal areas regulating Muslim religious and social life.
The entry on al-Shāfiʿī sets the stage for the information presented on the group as a whole. Al-ʿAbbādī continuously addresses the same legal topics that he considers al-Shāfiʿī's specialty in other members' entries. The most prominent legal themes discussed are matters concerning ritual purity, especially as it relates to worship and dietary laws 45 , as well as 41 Al-ʿAbbādī, Kitāb Ṭabaqāt, 6-7. 42 Ibid., 6. 43 Notwithstanding the ḥadīths that express that leadership belongs to the Quraysh, al-ʿAbbādī also presents al-Shāfiʿī as rejecting superiority based on descent in a statement in which al-Shāfiʿī rejects ʿAlī's claim to leadership based on his relationship to the Prophet (ibid., 35). 44 Ibid., 7. 45 Al-ʿAbbādī refers to questions over the permissibility of eating, for example, hoopoe, fox, and magpie (see ibid., 46, 47, and 50). Some of the debate over the permissibility of eating certain animals was probably mere casuistic, as many of JAIS ONLINE personal status and inheritance law. One notices, however, that despite al-ʿAbbādī's statement that al-Shāfiʿī was an expert in contract law he pays rather little attention to it when presenting the doctrines held by members of the Shāfiʿī school; contract law 46 is mentioned less than issues pertaining to linguistic knowledge 47 or theological doctrines. Legal methodology is also not a prominent topic, receiving less space than theology and grammar. The few times matters of legal theory are addressed, they refer mainly to ijtihād and qiyās -terms that al-Shāfiʿī considers to be of the same meaning or rather that qiyās is a form of ijtihād. 48 In addition to the reasons elaborated by Hallaq, 49 this lacuna regarding legal theory, perhaps, also reflects al-ʿAbbādī's own interest in substantive law, as indicated by his works in that field.
Yet, al-ʿAbbādī also goes beyond the framework in which he presents the legal contribution of al-Shāfiʿī. In addition to the above-mentioned fields of legal knowledge, there are other topics that are constant threads throughout the book. One is al-ʿAbbādī's emphasis on the school's superiority in knowledge of Arabic grammar and lexicography, a precondition for deriving legal rulings. 50 other than the famous litterateur al-Jāḥiẓ (d. 255/869). 51 Al-ʿAbbādī's concern for showing superiority in the Arabic language of al-Shāfiʿī and his followers has to be seen in contradistinction to what is said about Abū Ḥanīfa's linguistic competence. Abū Ḥanīfa is accused of foreign origin (that is to say, non-Arab, usually Persian or Afghan) and of speaking with an accent. 52 The resulting inferiority in Arabic of those jurists following Abū Ḥanīfa's legal teaching is showcased by alʿAbbādī in several references to the debate over the permissibility of drinking nabīdh. The question in this debate is whether the Arabic terms nabīdh and khamr are to be considered synonymous or not. The Qurʾān mentions only the word khamr as a prohibited drink, 53 thus leaving it unclear whether inebriating beverages called nabīdh (made, for example, out of honey, barley, spelt, or dates) 54 also fall under the Qurʾānic prohibition. Many Ḥanafīs differentiate between khamr and nabīdh, permitting moderate use of the latter. 55 Al-ʿAbbādī quotes al-Shāfiʿī as saying that the Arabs of Mecca and Medina used both terms synonymously and that nabīdh, therefore, is included in the Qurʾānic prohibition of khamr. 56 He gives this doctrine even more weight by citing it in the entry of the third/ninth-century jurist Abū Saʿīd ʿUthmān al-Dārimī, who was an eminent Ḥanafī jurist before switching to the Shāfiʿī school later in life 57 -thus, one may say, joining the school of law that is more knowledgeable in Arabic and, thus, more precise in adhering to God's ordinances.
Al-ʿAbbādī also pays much attention to matters that lie more within the realm of adab and social etiquette than law proper. He refers to legal 51 63 While the purpose of including these legal views is not immediately apparent, it may reflect the author's own interest in the topic of proper social manners as he himself composed a work on the etiquette of judges (adab al-qāḍī). 64 Perhaps, the author meant to give the impression that the founder of the school was a well-mannered person of high moral standing.
Taking a stand among contradictory doctrines
When looking at al-ʿAbbādī's work as a whole, it becomes clear that he considers the members of the school and their doctrines a coherent madhhab. They represent what the school stands for and they perpetuate the teachings of the founding father(s). Al-ʿAbbādī's double role as compiler of extant information and active participant in shaping the identity of the school comes to the fore when Shāfiʿī jurists depart from the master's teachings or when they hold contradictory views. In most cases he does not simply document these doctrinal disputes, but employs a number of authorial devices to point the reader to the 'correct' Shāfiʿī position.
One such way al-ʿAbbādī deals with contradictory views held by Shāfiʿī jurists is to present them without further comment, leaving it for the reader to decide which to follow. In general, al-ʿAbbādī only does this when the jurists involved do not belong to the circle of the founding fathers, and when no continuous link to al-Shāfiʿī or his direct disciples can be established. For example, he states under the entry of Abū Marwān Ismāʿīl b. Marwān, a jurist of the third generation whose teachers remain unnamed, a disagreement among Shāfiʿīs over whether it is permissible to specify an obvious meaning by means of analogy (takhṣīṣ al-ẓāhir bi-l-qiyās), that is to say, limiting the applicability of an obvious textual ruling by one arrived at in analogy to a textual statement. 58 Not quite as indifferent in his presentation is al-ʿAbbādī when presenting the controversy within the Shāfiʿī school over a person who frivolously neglects to utter the name of God when slaughtering an animal. The question is whether or not that person is deemed an unbeliever (kāfir) and whether the meat can be lawfully consumed. AlʿAbbādī states that the third generation jurist Abū ʿAbdallāh Muḥammad b. Isḥāq al-Saʿdī al-Harawī transmitted on the authority of al-Shāfiʿī that the eponym held that the intentionally neglectful butcher is not an unbeliever, but that the slaughtered meat is not lawful for consumption. This view, we are told, is analogous to the ruling that it is not permissible to eat the meat slaughtered by a Jew who uttered other than the name of God over the animal, a position attributed to ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib (r. 35-40/656-61) and also advocated by Abū Ḥanīfa. Yet, despite such endorsement, al-ʿAbbādī says that some Shāfiʿīs (baʿḍ aṣḥābinā) differ. They pronounce the meat lawful and the butcher an unbeliever as he frivolously omitted the name of God, drawing on the Companion Ibn ʿAbbās' (d. 68/687) statement that the meat slaughtered by a dhimmī is permissible even when he uttered other than God's name during slaughter. Al-Saʿdī, under whose entry this debate is recorded, opts for the permissibility of the slaughtered meat (the status of the butcher remains unclear), transmitting this view on authority of Ibn ʿUmar (d.73/693). 67 One may ask why al-ʿAbbādī does not unambiguously endorse the eponym's ruling on the intentionally neglectful butcher since no support for the contrary position of al-Saʿdī can be found among prominent 65 While al-ʿAbbādī generally gives the full name of a jurist at the beginning of his entry, he often refers only to the patronymic of a person when presenting actual rulings. As many jurists go by the same name, it often makes it difficult to identify the person with confidence. In the case of Abū Saʿīd, several jurists by that name are potential candidates. I have drawn attention to the most likely ones. 66 Al-ʿAbbādī, Kitāb Ṭabaqāt, 69. 67 Ibid., 66-7.
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Shāfiʿīs. It seems that he intends to present an alternative ruling to that of the eponym because he does not agree with it. The view that the neglectful butcher remains a believer despite committing an act of unbelief goes against the Ashʿarī view that faith includes acting in accordance with one's conviction (see below). Declaring the intentionally neglectful butcher a believer is more in line with the Māturīdī-Ḥanafī position that the verbal expression of faith determines the status of the believer as opposed to his/her actions. Since al-ʿAbbādī, who hails al-Shāfiʿī as a beacon to emulate, cannot reject the eponym's ruling outright, he gives subtle hints that it might be suspect by also attributing it to Abū Ḥanīfa, the rival, who is associated with Muʿtazilī theological doctrines. Furthermore, he presents an alternative ruling, accepted by some unnamed Shāfiʿīs, which is supported by eminent ) is said to have followed Abū Thawr in the opinion that the Friday prayer (jumʿa) does not have to be performed in the congregational mosque (aljāmiʿ) but Muslims are allowed to pray in their local mosques. Abū Thawr supported his view with a report that the second caliph ʿUmar (r. 13-23/634-44) had written to Abū Mūsā al-Ashʿarī (d. ca. 42/662) to perform the prayer wherever they were. Al-ʿAbbādī contrasts this opinion with that of al-Muzanī. Al-Muzanī is said to have objected to this view based on a transmission from ʿAlī that insists on observing the Friday prayer in the congregational mosque. 69 Although al-ʿAbbādī does not indicate here whose view a 'good' Shāfiʿī should follow, there are several hints about his preference. Given the public nature of the issue, it is not far-fetched to assume that ʿUmar as well as ʿAlī uttered their ruling during their tenure as caliph. As the fourth caliph, ʿAlī's 68 Ibn ʿAbbās and Ibn ʿUmar are also listed in the chain of people from whom al-Shāfiʿī received his knowledge, though in this case the eponym does not follow their teachings (cf. ibid., 84). 69 Al-ʿAbbādī, Kitāb Ṭabaqāt, 58-9.
ruling would be later than that of his predecessor and, hence, abrogate or rather supercede it. More importantly, al-ʿAbbādī already set the tone for which of al-Shāfiʿī's disciples is more authoritative in the entries of Abū Thawr and al-Muzanī. Al-Muzanī, an Egyptian disciple of al-Shāfiʿī, is showered with praise for his piety, legal acumen, and linguistic competence as well as for his skillful argumentation which, as al-Shāfiʿī himself observed, would silence even the devil. 70 In addition to giving preference to a particular disciple of al-Shāfiʿī, al-ʿAbbādī also uses difference in geographical location as a way of indicating the preferred among contradictory views held by Shāfiʿī jurists. He often rationalizes inconsistencies in Shāfiʿī doctrine by assigning them to different periods of al-Shāfiʿī's life, namely an early period spent in Ḥijāz and Iraq, and a later period in Egypt. The implied assumption is that the views al-Shāfiʿī pronounced in Egypt represent his final teaching and that his Egyptian disciples are of higher authority because they purportedly reflect and perpetuate al-Shāfiʿī's later doctrines -the principle of abrogation (naskh) is at work here too. In the above-mentioned case, al-Muzanī as the Egyptian disciple trumps the Iraqi Abū Thawr. 70 Al-ʿAbbādī, Kitāb Ṭabaqāt, 9-12. 71 Abū Thawr is considered to have established his own school, see Joseph Schacht, 'Abū Thawr,' in EI 2 , vol. 1, 155. 72 Al-ʿAbbādī, Kitāb Ṭabaqāt, 22-3.
Another example in which geography plays a role is cited in the entry of Abū Isḥāq Ibrāhīm b. Aḥmad al-Marwazī (d. 340/951), who held the view that one ought to fast part of the night. Al-ʿAbbādī states that Abū Saʿīd (here probably al-Iṣṭakhrī) disagreed with him. He hints at which view should be the preferred by saying that al-Marwazī was part of the circle of Shāfiʿī jurists 74 in Egypt, thereby implying that he follows the Egyptian doctrine of al-Shāfiʿī which is deemed most authoritative. 75 In another controversy, al-ʿAbbādī directly takes the side of the Egyptian doctrine. The matter is listed under the entry of Yūnus b. ʿAbd al-Aʿlā (d. 264/877), whom al-ʿAbbādī calls the traditionist (muḥaddith) and muftī of Egypt, and identifies as an associate of al-Shāfiʿī. Yet, despite his Egyptian credentials, al-ʿAbbādī also links him to the Ḥijāzī period by saying that he studied together with al-Shāfiʿī under the Meccan traditionist Ibn ʿUyayna (d. 196/811). 76 Yūnus is said 77 to have asked al-Shāfiʿī whether it is permissible to shoot at a group of unbelievers when women and children are among them. According to Yūnus, al-Shāfiʿī rejected its permissibility citing that the Prophet prohibited killing women and children. 78 Al-ʿAbbādī then comments that al-Shāfiʿī retracted this view in his Egyptian Risāla, implying that Yūnus' report is based on the outdated Ḥijāzī/Iraqi teachings of the master. In support of the new doctrine, al-ʿAbbādī refers to an unspecified report (khabar) that the women and children belong to the 74 Literally, qaʿada fī majlis al-Shāfiʿī bi-Miṣr. However, the death date of Abū Isḥāq al-Marwazī, who is counted among the third generation of Shāfiʿīs, is 340 AH, and thus it is implausible that al-ʿAbbādī meant that he actually attended the circle of al-Shāfiʿī. Furthermore, contrary to his usual practice, al-ʿAbbādī did not write the eulogy raḥimahu llāh after al-Shāfiʿī, though it might have been forgotten by a later copyist. 75 unbelievers and that those who shoot at them do not sin nor do they have to atone for it (lā ithma ʿalayhim wa-lā kaffārata). 79 Interestingly, in the way al-ʿAbbādī presents the matter, he accepts al-Shāfiʿī's ruling that is based on a report which is not further identified over his earlier view that is explicitly said to be supported by a prophetic saying. One may surmise that al-Shāfiʿī (as well as al-ʿAbbādī) was less the champion of adherence to prophetic ḥadīth than frequently portrayed. 80 The negative attitude toward al-Shāfiʿī's Iraqi teaching comes out most clearly in a quote by the latter's close companion and disciple alBuwayṭī (d. 231/845), about whom al-ʿAbbādī said that he succeeded the master after his death. 81 In the entry of Abū Ismāʿīl al-Tirmidhī (d. 280/893), al-Buwayṭī is quoting al-Shāfiʿī who proclaimed that he does not permit transmitting from him what he wrote in Iraq. 82 Here and elsewhere, al-ʿAbbādī emphasizes that the school's doctrines circulating in the Eastern part of the Islamic world, that is to say, where he himself studied, are based on al-Shāfiʿī's Egyptian works which Isḥāq b. Ibrāhīm al-Ḥanẓalī, who met al-Shāfiʿī in Egypt, had copied and taken back with him to the East. 83 Although the Iraqi doctrine was delegitimized by the eponym himself, his command was not heeded by later generations, as the documented persistence of Iraqi doctrines show. Even al-ʿAbbādī, who displays a strong preference for al-Shāfiʿī's Egyptian teaching, occasionally makes an exception, as in a dispute between al-Muzanī and al-Ḥusayn b. ʿAlī al-Karābīsī (d. 245 or 248/859 or 862). Al-Karābīsī is presented as one of the eminent jurists of Iraq and an important transmitter of Shāfiʿī teaching. When al-Muzanī remarks that he does not know the doctrine al-Karābīsī holds on authority of al-Shāfiʿī regarding a sale transaction involving wheat, al-ʿAbbādī defends al-Karābīsī's ruling saying that the reason is because al-Muzanī did not hear the old Iraqi doctrines of alShāfiʿī. 84 Moreover, al-Muzanī does not provide an alternative ruling. One is left with the impression that in this case it is al-Muzanī's shortcoming not to know al-Karābīsī's report of al-Shāfiʿī's Iraqi 79 Al- 86 We also find instances in which al-ʿAbbādī explicitly points out the 'correct' Shāfiʿī position. Yūnus b. ʿAbd al-Aʿlā, who, as noted above, may not have known al-Shāfiʿī's final doctrine on killing women and children of infidels in combat, nevertheless also transmits legal views on authority of al-Shāfiʿī that al-ʿAbbādī deems correct. He is credited with relating from al-Shāfiʿī the following ruling: When, among a group of people, a woman does not have a legal guardian, she can transfer her affairs to a man of that group in order that he can give her in marriage because it is a necessity 87 -the presumption is that no near male relative or judge is at hand to fulfill the function of guardian to give the woman in marriage. The transmission (riwāya) of this view is rejected by some Shāfiʿīs and by others accepted. Al-ʿAbbādī sides with the latter, calling it correct (wa-huwa al-ṣaḥīḥ). 88 Sometimes, however, al-ʿAbbādī objects not just to a particular view a Shāfiʿī jurist holds, but also rejects all of that person's transmissions. He mentions under the entry of Abū ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Shāfiʿī (d. after 221/836; we are told he received this nisba because he was a student [tilmīdh] of the eponym) that al-Shāfiʿī himself prohibited him from 85 ) reports that Abū ʿAbd al-Raḥmān's legal rulings were faithful to al-Shāfiʿī and were followed still in his own time. Al-ʿAbbādī's report that the legal rulings of this student of al-Shāfiʿī are categorically to be rejected may be due less to the inadequacies of the student's legal competence, but a result of his being well known for holding Muʿtazilī tenets, in particular the createdness of the Qurʾān. 90 By mentioning that the eponym himself renounced all of Abū ʿAbd al-Raḥmān's rulings, al-ʿAbbādī clearly distances the school from association with anyone holding unambiguously Muʿtazilī doctrines.
As the above examples show, al-ʿAbbādī quite successfully guides the reader to the correct doctrine of the school. 91 He indicates his preference in case of contradictory positions by presenting alternative rulings, having rivals to the Shāfiʿī school endorse one of the competing views, commenting on the geographic location and chronology of a ruling pronounced, how close a disciple was to the eponym, or even stating which legal ruling is correct. These presentational devices point toward those legal views of the school which the author deems authoritative amidst contradictory rulings transmitted by, and associated with, members of the Shāfiʿī school. As one would expect, in most cases--but certainly not in all--al-Shāfiʿī's views enjoy foremost authority, followed by those of his Egyptian disciple al-Muzanī. 
The Shāfiʿī school and theology: harmonizing al-Shāfiʿī's opposition to kalām with Ashʿarī theology Doubtless, a matter of concern for al-ʿAbbādī was the discrepancy between al-Shāfiʿī's reported negative attitude toward speculative theology (kalām) and his own intellectual pursuits in that field. AlʿAbbādī, as mentioned above, had studied with some of the foremost Ashʿarī theologians of his time, counting among his teachers Abū Isḥāq al-Isfarāʾīnī (d. 418/1027) and Abū Ṭayyib Sahl al-Suʿlūkī (d. before 404/1014, son to the more famous Abū Sahl al-Suʿlūkī [d. 369/980]), and he himself was considered an Ashʿarī theologian of some renown. 92 Since the late fourth/tenth century, many leading Shāfiʿīs tended to be affiliated in theology with Ashʿarism. 93 One may speak of a certain rapprochement between Ashʿarī theology and Shāfiʿī law. 94 Although alSubkī later criticizes al-ʿAbbādī for not paying enough attention to Ashʿarī members of the school, 95 it is safe to assume that al-ʿAbbādī tended more toward a rationalist Ashʿarī interpretation of theology than to traditionalism. 96 Instead of hiding al-Shāfiʿī's opposition to theology al-ʿAbbādī tries to present that his own (and that of other Shāfiʿīs) pursuit of theology is in line with the theological beliefs of the eponym and that the theology disparaged by al-Shāfiʿī is only directed against Muʿtazilī teachings. 94 Cf. Hallaq, 'Was al-Shafii the Master Architect,' 598-601; Makdisi, 'Juridical Theology of Shâfi'î,' 21-2. Makdisi attributes the 'infiltration' of Ashʿarīs in the Shāfiʿī school also by the former's efforts to receive the status of orthodoxy by affiliating themselves with a school of law. Since Muʿtazilism was mainly associated with the Ḥanafī school, traditionalism with the Ḥanbalī school, and both the Mālikī and Ẓāhirī school too weak, the Shāfiʿī school of law appealed as a home to Ashʿarī-leaning jurists. See Makdisi, 'Ashʿarī and the Ashʿarites I,' 46-8. 95 Makdisi, 'Ashʿarī and the Ashʿarites I,' 77. 96 In addition to al-ʿAbbādī's portrayal of theological doctrines of the school, the relative scarcity of ḥadīth to support legal as well as non-legal doctrines also point to his non-traditionalist leanings. In discussions of theology, hardly any ḥadīth are cited in favour of mainly Qurʾānic verses.
The opposition that al-Shāfiʿī expressed against engaging in kalām is well documented by al-ʿAbbādī. Associates of al-Shāfiʿī report that he prohibited kalām, 97 and said that those garbing themselves with theology do not prosper. 98 Worse still, according to al-Shāfiʿī, theologians (ahl al-kalām) should be whipped, paraded on a camel, and it be publicly proclaimed that this is their recompense for abandoning the Book and the Sunna and taking up theology. 99 This last tirade against theologians is documented in the entry of no other than the famous ḥadīth collector and critic al-Bukhārī (d. 256/870), who reports it on the authority of two of al-Shāfiʿī's close associates al-Karābīsī and Abū Thawr. 100 Al-Muzanī reports that al-Shāfiʿī advised him against engaging in kalām saying it is a science (ʿilm) that 'if you are correct in it, you do not receive reward and if you err, you commit unbelief -so stick with law'. 101 One notices a slight gradation in how vehemently alShāfiʿī condemns theology. The most negative comments are transmitted by personalities who knew al-Shāfiʿī during his stay in Iraq, whereas alMuzanī's report represents the Egyptian doctrine. One gets the impression that while in Iraq, the hotbed of Muʿtazilī activity, al-Shāfiʿī rejected any engagement in speculative theology. In Egypt, where he pronounced his new teaching, he softened in his condemnation and only warned about its potentially harmful consequences. 102 Since later Shāfiʿī jurists were busily engaged in theology, al-ʿAbbādī goes to great length in establishing that the theological positions that Shāfiʿīs like him hold are actually in harmony with the theological 97 Al-ʿAbbādī, Kitāb Ṭabaqāt, 34. 98 Ibid., 61. 99 Ibid., 54. 100 Al-ʿAbbādī explains the fact that al-Bukhārī did not transmit on authority of al-Shāfiʿī in his Ṣaḥīḥ saying that al-Bukhārī had sought the company of the eponym but al-Shāfiʿī had just passed away (ibid., 53). Other sources report that alBukhārī as well as other ḥadīth scholars did not deem al-Shāfiʿī a trustworthy transmitter. See Hallaq, 'Was al-Shafii the Master Architect,' 593-4; Chaumont, 'al-Shāfiʿī,' vol. 9, 184. 101 Al-ʿAbbādī, Kitāb Ṭabaqāt, 11. Makdisi says that al-Subkī also mentions this warning to al-Muzanī in his Ṭabaqāt al-Shāfiʿiyya. See Makdisi, 'Ashʿarī and the Ashʿarites I,' 67. 102 The later biographer of the Shāfiʿī school, al-Subkī, speaks of two doctrines of al-Shāfiʿī regarding engaging in kalām; one rejecting it and the other endorsing it in case of need but then only by the one qualified to undertake such study (see ibid.,' 67-8).
JAIS ONLINE teachings of the eponym. 103 As mentioned above, questions of theology are more prominently addressed by al-ʿAbbādī than those pertaining to legal methodology, the supposed forte of the school. Three topics receive special attention in his book: free will (qadar), the uncreatedness of the Qurʾān, and the definition of faith (īmān). In discussions of the first two, al-ʿAbbādī establishes that al-Shāfiʿī's opposition to kalām is directed against Muʿtazilī doctrines of free will and the createdness of the Qurʾān; and a discussion of faith shows that later Ashʿarī teachings are in line with al-Shāfiʿī's own convictions.
Free will (qadar) and compulsion (jabr)
In several places, al-ʿAbbādī reports on authority of al-Rabīʿ, al-Shāfiʿī's servant and transmitter of his Egyptian teachings, that the eponym refuted the doctrine of free will (qadar). Al-Shāfiʿī is credited with saying that apart from God's will, His creatures do not have a will. AlʿAbbādī includes a poem al-Shāfiʿī is said to have composed which expresses that God is the Creator of everything, of good and evil, and that He is the one to decide people's fate. 104 According to al-Rabīʿ, alShāfiʿī goes even further and condemns praying behind proponents of free will and intermarrying with them, 105 thus effectively declaring them heretics.
In addition to documenting that al-Shāfiʿī and the early members of the school denied free will, al-ʿAbbādī also guards against Shāfiʿīs appearing to be proponents of predestination. The view that God foreordains all of a person's life and that s/he does not really act but only God is associated with the so-called 'compulsionists' (the Mujbira or Jabriyya). 106 The compulsionists are frequently identified with the traditionalists, a somewhat amorphous group that is associated with Ibn Ḥanbal (d. 241/855) and his teachings, or more generally with those who 103 Makdisi points out that while al-Shāfiʿī was thoroughly anti-kalām in his alRisāla, the theology he rejected was the rationalist-philosophical theology of the Muʿtazila as opposed to the traditionalist, juridico-moral theology that was concerned with human's obligation toward God and his/her fellow creatures. See Makdisi, 'Juridical Theology of Shâfi'î,' 41-2 and 47. 104 Al-ʿAbbādī, Kitāb Ṭabaqāt, 13, 34, and 62. 105 Ibid., 12-13. 106 For a brief description of the Mujbira see W. Montgomery Watt, 'Djabriyya,' EI 2 , vol. 2, 365.
reject the doctrine of free will. 107 Al-ʿAbbādī couches the defense against accusations that Shāfiʿīs are compulsionists 108 in a lengthy discussion over invoking God in prayer (duʿāʾ). 109 He relates under the entry of Abū Sulaymān Ḥamd b. Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm al-Khaṭṭābī (d. 388/998) that he declared it senseless to do so because God decrees everything prior to creating the person and, thus, everything is preordained. 110 Al-ʿAbbādī presents a long refutation of this view, which is somewhat unusual in its form. Contrary to his usual practice of attributing doctrines to a particular person, the identity of the refuters is left unspecified; he refers to them only as a 'group' (ṭāʾifa) or 'others' (ākhirūn), yet emphasizes that their view is that of the madhhab and of the people of the Sunna (wa-hādhā huwa l-madhhab wa-qawl ahl alsunna). 111 Furthermore, no mention is made to any authority figures of the Shāfiʿī school. The arguments brought forth are all based on verses of the Qurʾān and prophetic ḥadīth. Al-ʿAbbādī's long elaboration appears not so much as a documentation of any particular doctrine held by a specific member of the school but rather a summary of how Shāfiʿīs ought to think and argue about preordination. When read in connection with statements on free will, it situates Shāfiʿīs doctrinally between the extreme positions of free will (qadar) espoused by the Muʿtazila and of compulsion (jabr) as attributed to the traditionalist camp. This middle position reflects the later Ashʿarī self-representation of their doctrine of acquisition (kasb). 112 Al-ʿAbbādī, thus, aligns the Shāfiʿī doctrine on 107 The doctrines of free will (qadar) and compulsion or predestination (jabr) have a complex, interdependent history that rises out of questions regarding the omnipotence of God, His justice, and human responsibility for their acts. JAIS ONLINE free will with that of the Ashʿarī school of theology 113 and, at the same time, distinguishes them from the extreme traditionalist position of preordination.
The uncreatedness of the Qurʾān
To further situate the school in its theological doctrines, al-ʿAbbādī also emphasizes that the early adherents of the school professed the uncreatedness of the Qurʾān. While publicly pronouncing the Qurʾān created was not yet an issue for al-Shāfiʿī as it came to be official policy only after his death, 114 we find his immediate disciples suffering persecution during the inquisition, the miḥna (which lasted from 218/833 to 235/850), when many scholars were asked to proclaim the government doctrine that the Qurʾān is the created word of God. 115 We are told that al-Shāfiʿī's close companion al-Buwayṭī, about whom al-Shāfiʿī is said to have predicted that he will die in 'iron,' was made to appear before the authorities in fetters and asked to profess the createdness of the Qurʾān, but refused and was incarcerated. 116 Al-Buwayṭī is further credited with stating that he who says that the Qurʾān is created is an infidel (kāfir), which, as al-ʿAbbādī asserts, was also the view of al-Muzanī and alRabīʿ, both of whom transmit it from al-Shāfiʿī. 117 Of another Shāfiʿī jurist, Yūsuf b. ʿAbd al-Aʿlā, who is described as a contemporary of al-Muzanī, 118 al-ʿAbbādī says that he stood up against the doctrine of the created Qurʾān in Egypt and, thereby, 'rendered the people of the Sunna victorious'. 119 That al-ʿAbbādī mentions the miḥna and that the early members of the Shāfiʿī school rejected, despite persecution, the createdness of the Qurʾān highlights the extent to which the Shāfiʿī school was from its inception opposed to Muʿtazilī doctrines. This may also be the reason behind al-Shāfiʿī's outright rejection of the legal views of the abovementioned Abū ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, who is said to have agreed in theology with Muʿtazilī tenets. Although al-Shāfiʿī did not address the nature of the Qurʾān in his writings, al-ʿAbbādī documents that his immediate disciples attest that he opposed the createdness of the Qurʾān doctrine. More importantly, al-ʿAbbādī's presentation of the Shāfiʿī doctrine on the Qurʾān also conveys the message that Ibn Ḥanbal was not the sole champion of the inquisition, but that prominent Shāfiʿī jurists formed part of the intellectual heritage that later informed Sunnī orthodoxy. This is of particular significance as al-ʿAbbādī does not consider Ḥanbalīs a school of law -as opposed to a school of thought or traditionalist attitude more generally. 120 His book, thus, documents that among schools of law it was the Shāfiʿī school that defended the doctrine of the uncreatedness of the Qurʾān. 121 Khālid al-Zanjī. 125 If al-Zanjī's Muʿtazilī pedigree was known to alʿAbbādī, he does not let on; the latter is acknowledged by al-ʿAbbādī as al-Shāfiʿī's teacher without further comment. 126 Ibrāhīm b. Yaḥyā does not find his way into al-ʿAbbādī's work. Nor does al-ʿAbbādī give any indication that some of al-Shāfiʿī's students held theological views that were not in line with the doctrine of the uncreated Qurʾān. He manages to avert any intellectual connection to Abū ʿAbd al-Raḥmān by reporting that al-Shāfiʿī himself condemned the legal thought of this student of his; a fortiori one may extend this also to his theological positions. Furthermore, al-Shāfiʿī's student al-Karābīsī, whom al-ʿAbbādī frequently cites as authority, is remembered for asserting the pronunciation of the Qurʾān to be created -a view that drew the ire of the traditionalists. 127 While I do not wish to imply that al-Shāfiʿī had Muʿtazilī leanings, 128 my point here is that al-ʿAbbādī selects what he presents of the theological persuasions of the early followers of alShāfiʿī in a manner that fits into his view of the school at his own time, an account of how the Ḥanafī school and Abū Ḥanīfa was slowly disassociated from the created Qurʾān doctrine see ibid., 54-60. 123 Hallaq, 'Was al-Shafii the Master Architect,' 593. 124 Although the above-mentioned ruling not to pray behind a proponent of free will would belie such tolerance. 125 
The definition of faith (īmān)
In addition to the school's opposition to the created Qurʾān doctrine, alʿAbbādī also establishes al-Shāfiʿī's position on faith (īmān). In a peculiar entry he presents a lengthy, three-page exposition on the definition of faith under a person of the first generation whose name cannot be ascertained. 129 Contrary to al-ʿAbbādī's usual practice of identifying jurists in their entries with their patronymic (kunya), their given name and that of their forefathers (sometimes going back several generations), and their nisba(s), we find here only the patronymic Abū ʿAmr and the nisba, which, as we are told by the editor of the work, is in the manuscripts used for the edition variously rendered al-Zanbarī, alZubayrī or written only as skeletal letters without diacritics after the initial zāʾ. 130 Missing is also any indication of how Abū ʿAmr came to receive the information he is transmitting on authority of al-Shāfiʿī -we are only told that 'he related that someone asked al-Shāfiʿī about faith'. 131 The answer that follows is very detailed, citing numerous Qurʾānic verses, and touches on all the main points that distinguish the 'Shāfiʿī' from the Murjiʾī and Māturīdī-Ḥanafī positions, without being identical to the traditionalist/Ḥanbalī definition of faith. 132 In his answer, al-Shāfiʿī first defines faith as practice (ʿamal), adding that verbal expression (qawl) is part of it and affirming that faith is not immutable, but can reach utmost perfection and clear deficiency. 133 129 Al-ʿAbbādī, Kitāb Ṭabaqāt, 31-3. 130 Ibid., 31, note 5. 131 Ibid., 31. 132 Muslim conceptions of faith are not easily summarized as each school of thought has various definitions of faith. The main two conceptions among Sunnīs are that of the Murjiʾīs, on which the Māturīdī-Ḥanafī positions are built, and the traditionalists/Ḥanbalīs, with the general features of which Ashʿarīs agree. The main differences (very simplified) between them are that the first camp emphasizes the word (qawl) or confession (iqrār) as the main element of faith (disregarding the works), whereas the second defines faith as work (ʿamal) and word together; furthermore, the first camp considers that faith is immutable and the second that it can increase and decrease according to the works performed. For a quick overview over the main definitions and points of contention, see Louis Gardet, 'Īmān,' EI 2 , vol. 3, 1170-4; a more detailed discussion is presented by Wensinck in The Muslim Creed, esp. 36-49. 133 Al-ʿAbbādī, Kitāb Ṭabaqāt, 31.
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God, al-Shāfiʿī continues, imposes upon the heart various ways in which to practice faith, namely by confession (iqrār), knowledge (maʿrifa), resolution (ʿaqd), acceptance (riḍan), and acknowledging (taslīm) that there is no god but God, who has no partner, who neither took a companion nor a son and that Muḥammad is His servant and His messenger, as well as by confessing to the reality of the prophets and scriptures God sent to humankind. 134 The sentences that follow in the text make clear that al-Shāfiʿī considers the heart the fountainhead (raʾs) of faith from which the performance of acts of faith springs forth. God, we are told, imposes on limbs and parts of the body certain acts which are part of faith and constitute the performance of it. 135 The divine impositions listed in the text are supported by Qurʾānic verses. -raḥim) , striving on the path of God (jihād fī sabīl llāh), and ritual purities; the legs are not to go where God prohibited them to go; and the face is to bend in prostration. 136 AlʿAbbādī ends his presentation of al-Shāfiʿī's definition of faith with the confirmation that faith is cumulative and may reach various degrees. Citing Qurʾānic verses that express that faith, evil deeds as well as guidance may increase, the concluding remarks of this passage are that there is 'increase and decrease with regard to deeds and reward for deeds' (fa-l-ziyāda wa-l-nuqṣān fī l-ʿamal wa-thawāb al-ʿamal). 137 In this entry of Abū ʿAmr al-Zanbarī, who otherwise is unknown, 138 we find a sophisticated understanding of faith, much of which is closely 134 Al-ʿAbbādī, Kitāb Ṭabaqāt, 31. 135 The text several times has a phrase 'it belongs to faith and this is how it is practised' (huwa min al-īmān wa-dhāka ʿamluhu). See al-ʿAbbādī, Kitāb Ṭabaqāt, 32, line 5-6 and 13-4, both said about the ear. 136 Ibid., 32-3. 137 Ibid., 33. 138 That al-Zanbarī is not further known despite being roughly contemporaneous with al-Muzanī, al-Zaʿfarānī, al-Rabīʿ and other important transmitters of al-Shāfiʿī's teaching suggests that he may have been invented and inserted by al-ʿAbbādī (or someone else) to give the impression that the eponym's in line with later Ashʿarī teaching. The defining characteristics of faith are the heart's conviction, its knowledge and pronouncement of the truth of God, His messenger and His message. In contrast to the Ḥanbalī understanding that faith is word and deed together, here we find word, that is to say, professing Islam, subsumed under the action which begins in the heart, emphasizing conviction as the source of the limbs' works of faith. Different from the theological doctrine of the Murjiʾī and Māturīdī-Ḥanafī school, faith can grow and decrease. Thus, al-ʿAbbādī situates the Shāfiʿī conception of faith squarely within the Ashʿarī position, just as he did regarding free will and the nature of the Qurʾān. 139 
Concluding remarks
The presentation of the author's role in composing a biographical dictionary has brought to the fore that the author is not merely a compiler of pre-existing information. Instead, he has an important impact on shaping the identity, the doctrine, and the authority structures of the group. It would be going too far to say that al-ʿAbbādī invented the image and doctrine of the Shāfiʿī school of law -as he surely did not make up all the information he presents. 140 Nevertheless, by arranging the information he collected in a certain manner and deciding which rulings to include and leave aside out of the many opinions held by each of these jurists he captures the identity of the madhhab at a certain point in time (first half of the fifth/eleventh century) and from a certain point of view (his own at least, if not representative for the Eastern part of the Islamic world). Fixing this identity in writing preserves it and influences how future generations view the school.
Al-ʿAbbādī shapes the identity of the Shāfiʿī school in various ways. In the introduction and in the entry on al-Shāfiʿī he presents his vision of theological position on faith is in line with or a precursor of later widely accepted doctrine in the Shāfiʿī school. 139 Al-ʿAbbādī is not the only one who addresses theological topics when commemorating the members of his school of law. Al-Subkī is blamed to have used his work on Shāfiʿī jurists as propaganda work for Ashʿarism (Joseph Schacht and C. E. Bosworth, 'al-Subkī,' EI 2 , vol. 9, 743-5, (p. 744); Makdisi, 'Ashʿarī and the Ashʿarites I,' 43 and 57-79). 140 While there is generally little reason to doubt that the jurists actually espoused the doctrines attributed to them, in some entries it is, however, doubtful that the person to whom a view is attributed held or articulated it in the manner presented by al-ʿAbbādī, especially when it concerns matters of theology or other non-legal matters.
JAIS ONLINE the school: superior to the Ḥanafī and Mālikī schools of law on account of the eponym's brilliance in understanding the authoritative texts and his insight in deriving rulings from them, in particular in the areas of worship, family law, and commercial transactions. Intellectual excellence, in al-ʿAbbādī's view, also manifests itself in one's personal conduct as al-Shāfiʿī's record in matters of etiquette and honor shows. From the outset of his book, al-ʿAbbādī conveys the message that following and emulating al-Shāfiʿī in his doctrines, methodologies, and conduct guarantees a jurist the best possible way of law-finding and marks a jurist as a member of the Shāfiʿī school.
Throughout the pages of his work al-ʿAbbādī manages to emphasize that the doctrines of the school represent a continuum and form a unity. He frequently states that a particular opinion is that of al-Shāfiʿī or goes back to one of the founding fathers -the immediate disciples of alShāfiʿī who either transmit the rulings of the eponym or whose own opinions are arrived at following his teaching. Important for constructing the doctrinal identity of the school are al-ʿAbbādī's subtle hints and editorial comments when he presents controversies among Shāfiʿī jurists. He takes recourse to a variety of authorial devices to indicate what the doctrine of the school, at least in his eyes, should be: He provides alternative rulings by lesser known or unnamed Shāfiʿīs, thereby providing an acceptable precedent for espousing the alternative; he associates a doctrine with a rival school, thereby making it less desirable for the true Shāfiʿī; he identifies geographical differences for positions held by jurists, with Egyptian doctrines generally being deemed superior to Iraqi rulings without the latter necessarily invalid; or he expresses clearly which ruling is correct.
Furthermore, by pointing out that a disciple of al-Shāfiʿī belonged to the Iraqi or Egyptian circle of the eponym, al-ʿAbbādī forms a hierarchy of authority and of authority clusters among the early members of the school, and by extension among later jurists who follow them. We notice in his work a tendency to elevate al-Muzanī as the 'true heir' of the master; he is frequently presented as the final voice in disputes among the followers. Later biographers of the Shāfiʿī school do not necessarily share al-ʿAbbādī's high view of al-Muzanī. Al-Subkī and al-Nawawī (d. 676/1277) distance the Shāfiʿī school from him, speaking of a separate madhhab of al-Muzanī. 141 141 Dedicating a separate school to al-Muzanī is likely due to the fact that in his main work, Mukhtaṣar, al-Muzanī pronounces some of al-Shāfiʿī's views to be wrong. See W. Heffening, 'al-Muzanī,' EI 2 , vol. 7, 822.
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suspect that some statements, in particular the lengthy ones, were inserted by al-ʿAbbādī to craft or support the theological identity of the school; an identity that is less a representation of historical reality than a reflection of al-ʿAbbādī's own outlook.
Yet, although al-ʿAbbādī is certainly an active participant in shaping the legal and theological identity of his school, he is also a compiler of information passed on from previous generations. This is evident in the fact that he does not streamline his account of the members of the Shāfiʿī school in a manner that is without contradictions or without any difference of opinions among them. In his dictionary, he manages to straddle the line--sometimes more successful, sometimes less so--between truthful transmission of the information received and fruitful arrangement and commentary on it in a manner that reflects how he would like the Shāfiʿī school to be seen. Hence, while al-ʿAbbādī's Kitāb Ṭabaqāt al-fuqahāʾ al-shāfiʿiyya remains an important document for the historical development of the Shāfiʿī school, it has to be read with the author's time and concerns in mind.
